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Lower mutual fund loads have plausibly boosted the stock wealth elasticity of U.S. 
consumption by enhancing stock liquidity and arguably by inducing stock ownership among 
middle-income families, consistent with theory and cross-section data (Guiso, Haliassios, and 
Jappelli (2003), Haliassios (2002), Heaton and Lucas (1996, 2000), and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2002)). In load-modified models, the stock wealth elasticity is declining in loads and more 
stable long-run wealth and income coefficients arise, especially controlling for mortgage 
refinancing and equity withdrawal activity.   Modified models imply that the stock wealth 
elasticity has risen, while conventional models overestimate the wealth and underestimate the 
income elasticities of consumption. 
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A standard explanation for the fall of the U.S. personal saving rate in the late 1990s is 
that higher stock prices boosted consumption via wealth effects (e.g., Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 2000).  Nevertheless, the historical link between consumption and 
wealth has not been very tight, especially after the saving rate stayed low after the stock market 
bust of the early 2000s, suggesting that stock wealth effects have either been poorly estimated 
(Ludvigson and Steindel, 1999) or offset by record levels of families refinancing mortgages or 
withdrawing equity from housing wealth (Canner, Dynan, and Passmore, 2002).  The current 
paper analyzes whether the time series link between wealth and consumption has been altered by 
financial innovations that have raised stock and housing wealth liquidity, via lowering mutual 
fund costs and increasing the proclivity of families to tap housing wealth or refinance mortgages. 
Stock wealth enters many econometric models of consumption based on the permanent 
income and life cycle hypotheses [LCH, e.g., Bosworth (1975), Brayton and Tinsley (1996), and 
Mishkin (1977)] and on buffer stock approaches.  An example of the latter is Carroll (1992), in 
which households maintain a target wealth-to-income ratio by altering saving, consistent with the 
1990’s drop in the personal savings rate and jump in the wealth-to-income ratio (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2000).  Estimated wealth coefficients are often seen as 
reflecting the impact of underlying economic variables on consumption through their effect on 
stock prices, whether from altering earnings fundamentals, the risk-less real interest rate, or the 
equity risk premium.  Because the theoretical link between wealth and consumption is strongest 
over long-run horizons, swings in wealth are generally viewed as having long-term effects. 
Nevertheless, the size and stability of the long-run wealth elasticity of consumption have 
been controversial for at least three reasons.  First, some argue that stock wealth has little effect 




(1999) found that stock prices affect the confidence of stock- and non-stock-owners similarly, 
suggesting that the information content of stock prices might arise from expectations.  Second, 
estimated stock wealth effects may be unreliable, as in Ludvigson and Steindel (1999), who find 
that long-run wealth coefficients shift much in rolling regressions. Third, the high concentration 
of stock assets might limit the size of the long-run wealth elasticity of consumption, as implied 
by evidence that the rich save differently [Carroll (2000b) and Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes 
(2004)] and by models in which labor and capital income uncertainty imply that consumption is 
concave in wealth under several standard utility functions (Carroll and Kimball, 1996).  
Alternatively, if the bequest motive is stronger among the wealthy (Carroll, 2000b), the marginal 
propensity to consume out of wealth is declining in wealth.  In either case, the distribution of 
wealth and income has implications for aggregate consumption (Carroll, 2000a).   
My study addresses the second and third criticisms by analyzing whether mutual fund 
costs add information about the long-run relationship between consumption, income, and wealth.  
Lower mutual fund costs may raise the aggregate wealth elasticity in two plausible ways.  First, 
lower loads reduce the transfer costs of tapping equity wealth to fund consumption, thereby 
making consumption more sensitive to stock wealth (Davis and Norman, 1990).  Second, 
because mutual funds were the most feasible vehicle through which middle-class families could 
own a diversifiable stock portfolio over the sample examined, lower loads in the presence of 
non-diversifiable labor income risk can theoretically boost stock ownership rates by reducing 
transfer and entry costs as in Haliassos and Bertaut (1995), Heaton and Lucas (1996, 1997, 
2000), and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002).
1  Indeed, equity mutual fund loads at a one-year horizon 
                                                             
1 A consensus is emerging that, “fixed costs…represent the key factor in stock market participation,” (Haliassios, 
2002, p. 29), and mutual fund costs are a key component of such costs (Haliassios (2002, p. 29) and differences in 




have a strong negative correlation (-0.87) with stock ownership rates (Figure 1).
2  If utility is 
concave in wealth, as Carroll and Kimball (1996) show under plausible assumptions, then wider 
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Figure 1: Equity Fund Loads Fall and Stock Ownership Rates Rise







This study assesses whether accounting for stock fund loads can improve estimates of the 
long-run relationship between consumption and stock wealth.  Specifically, the product of loads 
and stock wealth is added to models, where this term should be negative if falling loads boost 
stock liquidity or equity participation and thereby, the long-run sensitivity of consumption to 
                                                             
2Stock ownership data are not fully consistent for some minor definitional differences across SCF's (see Duca 
(forthcoming)).  The impact of these differences appears minor—for details, see an appendix available upon request 
from the author.  Ownership data are from Aizcorbe, et al. (2003), Durkin and Elliehausen (1978), Katona et al. 
(1968, 1970, 1971), and Kennickell, et al. (2000). SCF data on stock wealth distribution are likely less consistent 
than ownership rates.  The former are affected by factors altering the consistency of ownership rates and by small 
samples of the rich in early SCFs that gave rise to large discrepancies between SCF and IRS data.  Since 1983, SCF 
have over-sampled the rich.  Owing to their dichotomous nature, ownership rates are less affected by such problems 





3  This study focuses on empirical results to address some of the controversy over 
stock wealth effects and, for theoretical motivation, refers to papers on equity participation, the 
concavity of consumption, and the impact of transfer costs on portfolios.  
Because the sample covers the early 2000s, this study assesses how consumption was 
affected by greater mortgage-related activity in the form of large swings in mortgage refinancing 
volume and mortgage equity withdrawals (Canner, Dynan, and Passmore, 2002).   This mortgage 
activity marks a divergence from earlier behavior in two ways.  First, estimates provided below 
indicate that aggregate mortgage interest saving from refinancing has recently surged, reflecting 
plunging mortgage rates and a greater tendency for households to refinance for a given amount 
of interest rate saving (Duca and Anderson, 2004).  Second, applying an approach similar to that 
of the Bank of England (Davies, 2002) to U.S. Flow of Funds data indicates that mortgage equity  
withdrawals have accelerated from levels noted earlier by Canner, Dynan, and Passmore (2002). 
Because these two changes in mortgage-related behavior may have substantial effects on 
consumption during a period of shifting stock wealth, controlling for them in some specifications 
serves as an important robustness check against possible misspecification and as a means of 
evaluating competing explanations for shifts in long-run income and wealth elasticities.  
This paper is organized along the following lines.  As a prelude to the empirical results, 
the next section discusses how transaction costs can theoretically affect the magnitude of the 
long-run stock wealth effect on consumption. Section 3 presents the econometric models and 
data, with details on mutual fund and mortgage activity variables.  Section 4 reports the 
empirical results, which are summarized and interpreted in the conclusion. 
                                                             
3 This interactive term may also track changes in stock liquidity. While direct costs of buying stocks have fallen by 
about 50 basis points since 1980 (Jones, 2000), one-year loads have fallen by a larger 500 basis points,  consistent 
with the post-1980 rise in overall equity ownership rates stemming from greater indirect ownership. This study 




2. Why Lower Transactions Costs Could Theoretically Increase the Wealth Effect 
There are at least two basic, theoretical ways in which lower transactions costs could 
increase the size of the long-run effect of stock wealth on consumption.  
Enhancing the Liquidity of Stock Wealth 
First, by cutting the cost of accessing wealth, lower transactions costs raise the propensity 
to consume out of wealth. It is theoretically plausible that agents are more likely to realign 
portfolios if they face lower costs when transferring assets.  Liu and Loewenstein (2002) and 
Zakamouline (2002) find that transactions costs create a zone where it is optimal not to trade 
between risky and safe assets until portfolio misalignment becomes large enough to justify the 
transactions cost of realigning assets.  As proportional transfer costs rise, this “no trading” zone 
widens.  Davis and Norman (1990) find similar results assuming that utility is characterized by 
hyperbolic absolute risk aversion in a world of two assets: stocks having variable returns of a 
known variation and bank deposits yielding fixed returns.  As proportional asset transfer costs 
fall, the smaller is the range of stock price variation under which agents do not alter their 
portfolios and consumption in response to changing equity prices.
4  For middle-income families, 
diversification and limited wealth imply that mutual fund loads are the relevant transfer cost. 
Broadening the Distribution of Stock Wealth 
For families with limited wealth, mutual funds were likely the most feasible way to own 
diversified stock portfolio prior to exchange traded funds, and equity fund loads were arguably 
the most relevant transfer cost affecting equity participation. Recent models of equity 
participation imply that lower transactions costs of investing stocks (e.g., mutual fund loads) 
                                                             
4While it is hard to separate liquidity from stock ownership effects in this study, other studies find that markets value 
liquidity in that stock returns are positively correlated with bid-ask spreads [Amihud and Mendelson (1986a,b), 




could induce higher stock ownership rates (Heaton and Lucas (2000, 1997, 1996) and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2002)), particularly for middle-income families (e.g., Heaton and Lucas, 2000).  
Several facts are consistent with this view.  First, the rise in the equity ownership rate 
(Figure 1) owed to increased indirect ownership, reflecting a greater relative use of mutual funds 
as a means of owning stock (Duca 2005). Second, increases in stock ownership rates were largest 
among middle-income households, for whom the diversification appeal of mutual funds is 
relevant (Figure 2). Third, higher stock ownership rates are not largely due to shifts in the age 
profile of the U.S. population.  In fact, Laderman (1997) finds that demographic shifts cannot 
account for higher mutual fund ownership through the mid-1990s, which instead reflected  
Figure 2: Stock Ownership Rates Rise Most
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increases in ownership rates within most age cohorts.  Rising stock ownership seems to have 
been induced by lower equity fund loads stemming from improved financial productivity, as 
implied by Duca’s (2005) findings that equity fund loads are cointegrated with the rising use of 




improvements in financial sector productivity slightly led declines in mutual fund loads, which in 
turn slightly led increases in household use of mutual funds to own equity.  Thus, higher equity 
participation likely owes to technology than to demographic shifts or a general rise in stock 
market efficiency (which would have equally boosted direct and indirect stock ownership).  
Greater equity participation induced by lower equity fund loads could boost the overall 
stock wealth effect if the propensity to consume out of wealth among low and middle-class 
households exceeds that of the wealthy.  Consistent with the findings of Dynan, Skinner, and 
Zeldes (2004), if bequests are increasing in wealth or the very wealthy have stronger saving 
preferences, the ratio of consumption to stock wealth is increasing in equity participation.  With 
respect to the former possibility, Carroll (2000b) shows that under CRRA preferences [u(ct) = 
{c
1-ρ}/(1-ρ)], if bequests yield utility in a Stone-Geary form [v(w) = {(w+γ)
1-α/(1-α)}], then 
bequests are a luxury good if the rate of time preference (ρ) exceeds (α), implying the propensity 
to consume out of wealth is declining in wealth.  With respect to the latter possibility, Gentry and 
Hubbard (1998) find that people with high risk preferences who tend to earn higher returns, tend 
to save more to self-finance entrepreneurial investment owing to capital market imperfections. 
Theoretically, larger stock wealth effects could also be linked to broader stock ownership 
if uncertainty affects utility. Carroll and Kimball (1996) show that a precautionary savings 
motive arises (u’’’u’/u’’
2 = k>0) and consumption is concave in wealth under reasonable 
conditions if utility exhibits hyperbolic absolute risk aversion, which encompasses constant 
relative and constant absolute risk aversion. If risks to future capital returns and labor income are 
imperfectly correlated, consumption is strictly concave in wealth.  This implies that as stock 
ownership rates rise, the sensitivity of aggregate consumption to wealth should increase.  




The analysis primarily uses the dynamic ordinary least squares (DOLS) approach of 
Stock and Watson (1993) to estimate long-run relationships among consumption, income, and 
wealth.  This approach differs from the older Johansen-Juselius approach by taking into account 
information contained in leads of first differences of long-term variables.  In properly 
implementing the DOLS approach, the lag length on leads and lags of first differenced variables 
needs to be long enough to ensure that residuals are stationary.  The estimated models include a 
standard model, a mutual fund-modified model, and versions that include mortgage variables.  
The Standard or Baseline Model 
The baseline or standard model of consumption is of the form:  








t+i],  (1)  
where lower case letters denote logs, y = labor plus transfer income (omits property and wealth 
income), w
S = stock wealth, and w
O = other wealth. Two measures of consumption are used.  
One is spending on consumer non-durable goods and services (C
ns), which excludes durable 
purchases because durable consumption equals the service flow from the stock of durables.  As 
in the Federal Reserve Board’s econometric model, the second measure (C
nds) adds the service 
flow from the durable stock to C
ns. Three leads and lags of first difference terms are sufficient to 
generate stationary errors.  To avoid complications surrounding rationing during the Korean War 
and possibly large revisions to very recent data estimates, regressions are estimated using data 
spanning 1954:1-2002:4. Because 3 leads and lags are used, the availability of load data since 
1959:Q4 permits equations (1) and (2) to be estimated over the sample 1955:1 to 2002:1.  
Eq. (1) is similar to the model of Ludvigson and Steindel (1999), but differs in two ways.  
First, because transfer income often offsets swings in labor income, the income term includes 




stock wealth coefficients, eq. (1) departs from Ludvigson and Steindel by separating wealth into 
stock and other assets.  This is done because it is unlikely that mutual fund costs track the 
transaction costs of non-stock assets, such as real estate fees.  In addition, the main hypothesis 
tested is whether stock ownership rates affect the stock wealth channel and it is the link between 
equity participation and loads that mainly justifies using loads to proxy for distribution effects.  
The Mutual Fund-Modified Model 
The modified model adds the product (w
sL) of log stock wealth (w
s) and the level of the 
average equity fund load (L), and adds 3 leads and lags of its first difference to eq. (1): 












t+i]  (2)  
Eq. (2) allows equity fund loads (L) to affect the elasticity of consumption with respect to 






γ,              (3) 
where it is hypothesized that β>0, γ>0, δ>0, and φ<0.  One qualification about using L to proxy 
for stock ownership rates is that doing so runs the risk of measuring an explanatory variable with 
error, which can potentially result in serious estimation problems.   
While the income and wealth terms are conventional, the equity mutual fund load 
variable is not. Following Duca’s (2000, 2005) studies of how mutual fund costs have affected 
M2 balances and household equity portfolios, respectively, loads are measured using fees from a 
sample of large equity mutual funds that are aggregated into an average based on each fund’s 
relative share of assets under management in the sample.  Details on Duca’s panel are as follows.  
One measure, L, tracks near-term loads using the weighted-average front-end and back-end load 
(as a percentage of asset transfers), where the back-end load is for withdrawals within a year of 




assumes investors have a short horizon, an alternative, L5, employs a five-year horizon, using 
front-end loads divided by five and back-end loads for withdrawals after five years, also divided 
by five.  In regressions not shown, results are similar using L5 in interactive stock wealth terms. 
While L and L5 may be distorted if mutual funds raise expense ratios when cutting loads, 
results are similar if expense ratios are added to L and L5, in line with similar trends in L, L5, 
and annual (post-1980) estimates of Rea and Reid (1998), who show that total equity fund costs 
fell in the 1990s as lower loads outweighed slightly higher expense ratios. Better technology 
likely cut costs as implied by Duca’s (2005) findings that the broadest measure of equity fund 
costs (L5 plus expense ratios) is cointegrated and negatively related to productivity in banking 
(the only financial sector for which productivity data are available), and that long-run 
movements in bank productivity embodied in an error-correction term lead short-run changes in 
mutual fund costs (and portfolio behavior), with no reverse causality. 
Because data before the mid-1980s are sketchy and incomplete, mutual fund costs were 
based on a sample of large mutual funds.  Funds were selected if their assets were at least $1 
billion at year-end 1991 if the fund existed before the mid-1980s; were at least $2 billion at year-
end 1994 if the fund's inception date occurred after 1983; were at least $5 billion at year-end 
2003; or were at least $250 million at year-end 1975.  The first criterion reflects whether a fund 
was sizable during the early 1990s, when bond and equity mutual fund loads fell and households 
shifted assets out of M2 into mutual funds.  The second criterion reflects whether a growing but 
new fund was large near the end of these portfolio shifts out of M2 (Duca, 2000). The third 
criterion reflects whether a fund remained large following the stock market bust of the early 
2000s.  Given the stock appreciation of the 1990s, the hurdles for newer funds were higher for 




avoids excluding funds that were relatively large in 1975 from distorting averages when fewer 
funds existed. Also excluded were funds that were closed-end, closed to new investors, only 
open to employees of a specific firm, or institutional.  One member, the Windsor Fund, became 
closed to new investors, but was included because its cousin (Windsor II) was started when the 
Windsor fund became closed to new investors and both funds are large. Also included because of 
its size is the Magellan Fund which became closed to new investors in 1998.  133 equity funds 
are in the sample (a list is available) using data from the funds and various issues of Morningstar, 
IBC/Donoghue, and CDA/Wiesenberger (a, b).  
L and L5 use quarterly loads of sampled funds.  Since only year-end asset data on mutual 
funds are available, quarterly asset weights are interpolated from a year-end data (annual weights 
are commonly used to construct quarterly data) and the quarterly inception dates of funds.  Since 
year-to-year changes in asset weights are small, using interpolated quarterly weights poses few 
problems.  In contrast, annual data indicate a much larger impact of changes in fund load fees on 
annual changes in weighted-average loads.  Since quarterly data on individual fund load fees are 
combined with interpolated quarterly asset weights, the series likely tracks asset-weighted 
quarterly load changes well.   This also poses little handicap because the study focuses on the 
long-run relationship between stock wealth and consumption and since most quarterly changes in 
the interactive w
sL variable reflect swings in stock wealth (w
s).  Standard tests indicate unit roots 
for L, w
sL and the log levels of the income, consumption, and wealth variables used. 
Mortgage Activity Modified Models 
To assess the impact of changing mortgage activity on consumption, I(1) variables 
tracking mortgage refinancing activity (REFI) and mortgage equity withdrawals (MEW) were 




three leads and lags of their first differences.  Because some observations are zero or negative, 
these variables are not in logs, but are constructed as ratios to non-property income.
5 
Following Duca (1990) and Anderson (1993), quarterly interest cost savings from 
mortgage refinancings were constructed using three data series.  First, the dollar volume of 
mortgage refinancing was tracked using Anderson’s data on mortgage-backed security (MBS) 
liquidations by Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, and Freddie Mac (Duca and Anderson, 2004).  This 
approach has the advantage of tracking dollar volumes since 1970, in contrast to the Mortgage 
Bankers’ Association (MBA) index of applications for mortgage refinancing, which indexes the 
number—not the dollar volume—of refinancing applications since the early 1990s.
6  The 
approach used here allows the interest rate savings from refinancings to be measured separately 
from mortgage equity withdrawals, which stem from home equity borrowing, home sales, and 
cash-out refinancings.  The main drawback of the MBS approach is that it omits the refinancing 
of mortgages that were not packaged into MBS’s.  However, the MBS series may consistently 
track the aggregate volume of refinancing activity since Duca and Anderson (2004) find that the 
MBA index and MBS liquidations line up closely over a common sample.  To convert 
refinancing volume into interest cost saving, the average reduction in interest rates is measured 
using the ratio of interest rates on the old to the refinanced mortgage multiplied by the effective 
rate on new 30-year fixed-rate, conventional mortgages (Freddie Mac).  This rate gap is 
multiplied by the amount of refinanced MBSs to calculate dollar savings from refinancing (real 
and annualized).  Next, since these mortgage cost savings can aid discretionary spending for a 
                                                             
5 The greater propensity for households to refinance mortgages and tap mortgage equity wealth reflects several 
factors, such as technology (lower fixed costs and less time), tax changes, and home sales (which affect equity 
withdrawals). For purposes of measuring income and wealth elasticities, the two mortgage variables implicitly 
control for these factors.   The cointegrating vectors that have mortgage variables are already large and it becomes 
more difficult to identify unique cointegrating vectors as the number of variables rises. Each additional variable also 




few years, the interest savings of mortgage refinancings over the past three years is cumulated 
and divided by non-property income to create REFI.  This ratio to non-property income is used 
because refinancing savings are zero in many quarters and the consumption models are in logs. 
  Similar to the Bank of England’s series for the U.K. (Davey, 2001), mortgage equity 
withdrawals (MEW) equal net mortgage borrowing (including home equity loans) minus 
household residential investment (seasonally adjusted, Flow of Funds data, table F100) divided 
by non-property income. The series differs slightly from the Bank of England’s in not netting out 
the costs of selling homes or originating mortgages, which are unavailable over the long sample.
7  
In most years of the sample, households tended to invest more in housing than they borrowed, 
partly reflecting the tendency for new home buyers to provide down-payments.  However, this 
has reversed in recent years, when mortgage equity withdrawals jumped to as much as 5 to 6 
percent of non-property income at a time of substantial refinancing activity (Figure 3).  
Nevertheless, mortgage equity withdrawals and the interest reduction from mortgage refinancing 
activity have sometimes diverged, such as in the mid-1990s when mortgage refinancing jumped 
and mortgage equity withdrawals fell back.  For this reason, it may be empirically important to 
control for both types of activity by including both REFI and MEW.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
6 Note that REFI was set to 0 before 1970, which is reasonable given the rising trend of mortgage rates from the 
mid-1950s to 1970 and the low level of refinancing activity from 1970 to the mid-1980s. 
7 U.S. existing home sales data begin in 1966 and data on average selling costs per home are unavailable (standard 
realtor commissions do not apply to sales directly made by owners).  Mortgage cost data (including points, Freddie 





























Figure 3: Mortgage Equity Withdrawals and Cost Savings From Mortgage Refinancings
Recently Surge, But Have Not Always Moved in Lock-Step
mortgage interest savings (REFI)
(right-axis)




4. Empirical Results 
Results from full sample Johansen and DOLS models are presented.  Then rolling 
regression DOLS results are reviewed to assess the stability of the elasticity estimates. Finally, 
DOLS results are reevaluated adding a time trend interacted with stock wealth to the models.  
4.1 Full-Sample Cointegration and DOLS Results 
Johansen cointegration tests are discussed (Table 1) before the DOLS results, with lag 
lengths set at the minimum needed to find a unique cointegrating vector using the rank criterion 
(trace statistic) allowing for a deterministic time trend in each variable (which is reasonable for 
income and consumption), but not a time trend in the vector.  A unique cointegrating vector can 
be found in each case, with non-property income (y), non-stock wealth (w




having positive and statistically significant coefficients (cointegrating vector signs are reversed 
to express equilibrium consumption as a function of variables).  One difference is that the 
income coefficients are higher and more reasonable in the load-modified models, where the trace 
statistic is more significant using the broader concept of consumption.
8  In the load modified 
models (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8), the interactive term (w
sL) is significant and negative. This 
implies that higher loads are associated with a smaller, overall positive impact of stock wealth on 
consumption, equal to the coefficient on w
s plus the product of L and the coefficient on w
sL.)  
The refinancing variable has a positive and significant effect that is larger in the non-load 
modified models, but the mortgage equity withdrawal variable (MEW) has the anticipated 
positive and at least marginally significant coefficient only in the load modified models.  These 
and other aspects of the mortgage variables are discussed further with the DOLS results. The 
DOLS approach to estimating cointegration is plausibly superior to the Johansen-Juselius 
approach in estimating consumption with current income data because consumption theoretically 
depends on permanent or expected income.  As Ludvigson and Steindel (1999) note, the reason 
is that the DOLS approach implicitly tracks permanent income better because unlike the 
Johansen-Juselius approach which includes lags of first differences when estimating 
cointegrating vectors, the DOLS approach also includes leads of first differences of variables 
when estimating long-run coefficients, thereby minimizing bias in estimating long-run income 
effects if consumption anticipates future income, consistent with most theories of consumption. 
DOLS models are estimated using equations (1) and (2). As shown in the odd-numbered 
columns of Table 2, the standard model yields reasonably signed coefficients.  However, the 
corresponding load modified models (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8, respectively) yield more plausible 
                                                             
8 In this sense, the Johansen tests for load-modified models favor using a broad measure of consumption, consistent 




magnitudes of the income elasticity of consumption.  Also, the stock and non-stock wealth 
coefficients are larger in the corresponding standard models, which imply a fixed stock wealth 
elasticity of 3.7 to 5 percent for narrow consumption (c
ns) and 5 to 6-½ percent for broader 
consumption.  Consistent with the hypothesis regarding loads and wealth, the coefficient on the 
interactive term w
sL is negative and statistically significant in each corresponding load-model.  
This finding, coupled with a smaller non-interactive stock wealth coefficient in corresponding 
load-modified models implies that the overall stock wealth elasticity is smaller in load models 
than in corresponding standard models because the overall stock wealth elasticity in each load-
modified models equals the coefficient on w
s plus the product of L and the coefficient on w
sL.   
Thus, the relatively high loads of the 1960s and 1970s imply a lower overall stock market 
wealth effect in the early part of the sample and the lower loads of the late part of the sample 
imply a larger overall effect in recent years. This is illustrated in Figure 4, which plots the sum of 
the coefficient on stock wealth with the product of L and the coefficient on w
sL from the load 
and mortgage modified model of narrow consumption (fourth column) with the stock elasticity 
from the corresponding standard model (third column).  Notice that although the overall stock-
wealth elasticity has risen according to the load-modified model, it is always below the stock-
wealth elasticity estimate of the baseline, fixed-effects specification. Related to this pattern—
common to each comparison of corresponding standard and load-modified models—is that the 
load-modified models yield larger income coefficients in the full sample.  This may arise 
because the load models are arguably better specified, as suggested by rolling regressions 
yielding stock and income coefficients that vary less over time.  In particular, the larger income 
and smaller wealth coefficients may reflect that load modified models put less weight on stock 
wealth early in the sample when stock wealth and income are more closely correlated. 
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Figure  4:  Stock  Wealth  Elasticity  of  Broad  Consumption  (Mortgage  Models)
Constant Stock Effect
(standard mortgage model)




Results from including mortgage activity variables have similar and dissimilar aspects 
across the corresponding models.  As in the Johansen estimates, the refinancing variable is 
positive, above unity, and significant in each specification (3, 4, 7, and 8), with larger 
coefficients in the corresponding standard models.  For two reasons, the long-run elasticity of 
consumption with respect to REFI could exceed unity.  First, households may spend more than 
the interest savings if they re-lever their balance sheets, perhaps even restoring their previous 
debt service burden (McKelvey, 1994).  Indeed, despite record refinancing activity, Federal 
Reserve data show only a modest dip in household debt service (financial obligations) burdens in 




Given that recent debt-payments-to-income ratios are around 14 percent, a full re-levering of 
mortgage interest cost savings to finance spending would boost spending by a factor near seven 
(roughly the inverse of the debt burden ratio).  Second, the variable does not track all interest rate 
savings, since REFI omits cost savings from the refinancing of mortgages that were not 
packaged into MBS’s.  In fact, roughly half of all household mortgage debt was packaged into 
MBS’s in recent years according to Flow of Funds data.  Combining these factors, the seemingly 
large coefficients on REFI in Tables 2 and 3 cannot be summarily dismissed as being too large.   
  Compared to findings regarding refinancing effects, results for the mortgage equity 
withdrawal variable differ not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively when comparing models.  
MEW is statistically insignificant in the standard stock wealth specifications (3 and 7), but has a 
positive and highly significant impact in load-modified models (4 and 8).  
4.2 Estimates From Rolling DOLS Regressions 
Rolling regressions are run using a 25-year horizon to assess the reliability of estimates. 
Unlike Ludvigson and Steindel (1999), who use a 10-year rolling horizon for their more 
parsimonious model, a 25-year rolling horizon is used because there are up to four extra sets of 
wealth and mortgage activity terms (the level and 6 first difference terms for each term) that use 
up as many as 28 more degrees of freedom. 25 years allows the 43 coefficients of models 4 and 8 
to be estimated with 56 degrees of freedom, which is reasonable for estimating long-run effects. 
From models 5 and 6, Figure 5 plots the coefficients on w
s and w
sL from the load-
modified model, along with 1 standard-error bands.
9 In rolling regressions, the coefficient on w
s 
from the standard model shifts a great deal and nears zero, in contrast to that from the load-
modified model, which moves less over time.  This finding is not the by-product of instability in 
                                                             
9Broader consumption yielded coefficients that varied less over time, but the same qualitative comparisons between 




the coefficient on w
sL, nor in the estimated income elasticity, which shifts less over time in the 
corresponding load-modified models (Figure 6).  Although the coefficient on w
sL is about zero 
in samples ending before the mid-1980s, this largely reflects that loads were flat through most of 
the 1970s and thus add little information in earlier years.  In rolling samples ending after the 
early 1980s, which include periods when loads differ, the coefficient is negative and relatively 
stable.  These different patterns for stock wealth and income elasticities are more apparent in the 
mortgage-modified models (see Figures 7 and 8, respectively).  Finally, another indication that 
accounting for mutual funds can improve parameter stability is that the rolling regression 
coefficients in the load-modified models are near the full-sample DOLS estimates (Table 2) in 
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Fig.  5:  Stock  Wealth  Coefficients  from  25-Year  Rolling  Regressions
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Fig.  6:  Income  Elasticity  Coefficients  from  25-Year  Rolling  Regressions
(Non-Mortgage  Models  of  Broad  Consumption)
Standard  model
Load-modified  model
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Fig.  7:  Stock  Wealth  Coefficients  from  25-Year  Rolling  Regressions






 (standard mort. model)
w
s
L (load-modified mortgage model)
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Fig.  8:  Income  Elasticity  Coefficients  from  25-Year  Rolling  Regressions





Note: dashed lines denote one-standard deviation bands.
 
4.3 Load Versus Time Trend Effects on Stock Wealth Elasticities 
One concern is that loads may pick up a time trend, even though loads are flat until 1973.  
To address this issue, the product of a time trend and wealth is added to the models in Table 2.
10  
As shown in Table 3, the time-stock wealth term is significant and positive in standard models 
(columns 1, 3, 5, and 7), indicating a growing sensitivity to stock wealth over time.  However, in 
the load models, the interactive load (w
sL) terms remain at least marginally significant and are 
more significant than the interactive time (w
s*T) variables (columns 2, 4, 6, and 8).  In addition, 
signs on the time-wealth variable shift from positive in two conventional models (column 1 and 
3) to negative in corresponding load models (columns 2 and 4), while among the models of 
broad consumption, the time-wealth term is insignificant in one load-model (column 6).  In only 
                                                             
10 Leads and lags of the first differences of w
sL are omitted because they are co-linear with those of w




one case is the time-stock wealth term positive and marginally significant in a load-model 
(column 8), but it is less significant than the interactive load-stock wealth variable.   
Two other patterns of results cast doubt on the approach of adding interactive time/wealth 
variables.  First, the non-interactive stock wealth (w
s) terms remain significant in the load models 
when the time-interactive stock wealth (w
sT) variable is present, but become insignificant in the 
time-modified models of broad consumption (columns 5 and 7).  Second, the coefficients on the 
non-interactive and time-interactive stock wealth terms from time-modified models move much 
in rolling regressions, as do the income coefficients (charts and an appendix demonstrating this 
point are omitted to conserve space, but are available from the author). Thus, using loads 
outperforms using a time trend in several empirical dimensions, in addition to providing an 
economic rationale for why long-run stock wealth effects have become more important.   
5. Conclusion 
Through enhancing the liquidity of stock wealth and by inducing higher stock ownership 
rates, falling equity mutual fund loads could theoretically increase the aggregate long-run wealth 
elasticity of consumption.  The latter channel partly depends on whether utility is concave in 
wealth, which can arise if uncertainty affects utility (Carroll and Kimball, 1996) or if the bequest 
motive is stronger among the very wealthy (Carroll 2002).  If utility is concave in wealth and if a 
decline in the transaction costs of owning a diversified portfolio of stocks induces less wealthy 
households to become shareholders, then lower transactions costs can plausibly induce an 
increase in the long-run impact of stock wealth on aggregate consumption. This study tests 
whether equity fund loads add information about the long-run relationship between income, 
stock wealth, other wealth, and consumption in the U.S.  Findings indicate that the stock wealth 




relationships between consumption and stock wealth and between consumption and income are 
obtained when accounting for such costs. In this sense, greater market efficiency in the form of 
lower mutual fund costs has ostensibly boosted stock liquidity and equity participation and 
accompanied an underlying increase in the long-run elasticity of consumption with respect to 
stock market wealth in the United States. 
These results help reconcile Ludvigson and Steindel’s (1999) finding that conventional 
estimates of long-run stock wealth effects are imprecise with evidence (1) that stock prices affect 
the spending of shareholders more than non-shareholders (see Dynan and Maki (2001) for U.S. 
evidence and Attanasio, Banks, and Tanner (2002) for U.K. evidence) and (2) that the personal 
saving rate and the wealth-to-income ratio are negatively correlated. The findings also accord 
with microeconomic evidence (e.g., Carroll, 2000a) that shifts in the distribution of wealth can 
have implications for the behavior of consumption at the aggregate level.  
With respect to macro-policy implications, the load-modified models imply that although 
the long-run wealth elasticity of consumption has risen over time, conventional models appear to 
overestimate the wealth elasticity and underestimate the income elasticity over long samples, 
especially when controlling for mortgage refinancing and equity withdrawal activity.  These last 
factors have become increasingly important in light of the greater tendency for households to 
refinance mortgages and tap housing equity.  Overall, findings indicate that it important to 
account for innovations that have reduced the costs of investing in mutual funds and of tapping 
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Appendix: Why This Study Focuses on How Changes in Stock-Ownership and Mortgage 
Activity, Rather Than Changes in Home-Ownership Rates, Could Affect Consumption 
The paper focuses on stock- rather than home-ownership effects for several reasons.  
First, the homeownership rate fluctuated in a narrow range (63-66%) over most (1965-2002) of 
the sample (see Figure 9) and has only increased slightly beyond this range in recent years, from 
66% to 68%.  This is in contrast to the stock ownership rate, which more than doubled in the last 
25 years, from around 25% in 1977 to 51.9% in 2001, with most of the increase occurring by 
1998, when the equity participation rate reached 48.9%.  With the exception of the 2-percentage 
point increase in homeownership rates since the late 1990s, other data indicate that the post-WW 
II rise in homeownership rates largely occurred in the late 1940s and 1950s, which predates most 
of the sample used in estimation. 
Third, shifts in the income coefficient from rolling regressions of the conventional model 
showed up well before homeownership rates increased in the late 1990s.  Fourth, while there has 
certainly been an increase in the liquidity of housing wealth, most of this greater liquidity has 
occurred only in recent years and the analysis attempts to control for these effects by including 
estimates of mortgage cost reductions from refinancing activity and of mortgage equity 
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Figure 9: U.S. Homeownership Rates Stayed Within a Narrow
Range Until the Late 1990s
percent 
 
Table 1: Johansen-Juselius Estimates of Equilibrium Consumption Implied by Cointegrating Vectors 
 (Sample: 1955:1-02:4, uses data in levels from 1954:1-2002:4) 
 
Models:        1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8   
 
      Services & Nondurable Goods (c
ns)     Services & Nondurables + Durable Service Flow(c
nsd) 
Standard    Load         Standard &       Load &  Standard    Load           Standard &       Load & 
                      MEW/REFI   MEW/REFI                MEW/REFI    MEW/REFI 
 





















o)    (7.41)    (2.14)    (10.39)   (2.97)    (6.72)    (4.17)    (9.17)    (3.50) 
 










s)    (8.21)    (2.57)    (4.90)    (8.82)    (8.95)    (7.77)    (3.53)    (13.91) 
 
Stock Wealth        -0.0016
*   
  -0.0015
**      -0.0024
**      -0.0027
** 
* Load (w
sL)        (2.38)        (-3.66)       (-6.51)       (-8.33) 
 
Refinancing             14.761
**  5.7893
**          19.1693
**  4.7306
** 
Savings (REFI)          (6.44)    (2.99)            (5.78)    (3.21) 
 
Mortgage Equity           0.3750
+  0.5164
**           0.7935
**  0.5674
** 
Withdrawal (MEW)          (1.78)    (2.71)             (2.59)    (3.89) 
 









Trace 1 CE    24.769   46.558   67.258      93.638  23.933   46.630   62.881     93.232 
Lag Length       1       1       2         3       1       3       2         3 
# sign vectors      1       1       1         1       1       1       1         1 
 
Coefficient signs from cointegrating vectors are flipped to express equilibrium consumption. Constants are omitted to save space.  




Table 2: DOLS Estimates 
(Sample: 1955:1-02:1, uses data in levels from 1954:1-2002:4) 
 
Models:        1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8   
 
      Services & Nondurable Goods (c
ns)     Services & Nondurables + Durable Service Flow(c
nsd) 
Standard    Load         Standard &       Load &  Standard    Load           Standard &       Load & 
                      MEW/REFI   MEW/REFI                MEW/REFI    MEW/REFI 
 
 





















o)    (15.23)   (5.65)     (15.96)  (8.20)    (13.64)   (6.84)     (15.22)  (8.09)   
 










s)    (14.40)   (9.15)    (14.85)   (13.29)   (16.89)   (12.16)    (11.81)  (17.33)  
 
Stock Wealth        -0.0017
**      -0.0012
**      -0.0026
**      -0.0025
** 
* Load (w
sL)        (-4.90)        (-4.19)       (-8.96)       (-10.39) 
 
Refinancing             11.3908
**  8.7253
**          11.1159
**  5.4791
** 
Savings (REFI)           (8.47)   (7.52)            (6.68)    (6.49) 
 
Mortgage Equity          0.0078 
  0.2407
*          -0.1432
  0.3248
** 
Withdrawal (MEW)           (0.07)   (2.54)             (-1.12)  (4.27) 
 




Table 3: DOLS Estimates With Time*Stock Wealth 
(Sample: 1955:1-02:1, uses data in levels from 1954:1-2002:4) 
 
Models:        1         2         3         4         5         6         7         8   
 
      Services & Nondurable Goods (c
ns)     Services & Nondurables + Durable Service Flow(c
nsd) 
Standard    Load         Standard &       Load &  Standard    Load           Standard &       Load & 
                      MEW/REFI   MEW/REFI                MEW/REFI    MEW/REFI 
 





















o)    (8.33)    (5.62)    (10.03)   (6.74)    (9.32)    (6.60)    (10.68)   (6.86) 
 




**  -0.0009  0.0367
**  -0.0018  0.0230
* 
Wealth (w
s)    (1.92)    (5.15)    (2.21)    (3.17)    (-0.12)   (3.53)    (-0.31)   (2.20) 
 
Stock Wealth        -0.0027
*   
  -0.0014
+      -0.0022
**      -0.0015
* 
* Load (w
sL)        (3.61)        (-1.84)       (-3.64)       (-2.29) 
 
Stock Wealth    0.00011
**  -0.00010
+  0.00008






sT)    (4.23)    (-1.73)   (3.51)    (-0.31)   (9.44)    (0.76)    (10.22)   (1.65) 
 
Refinancing             10.2395
**  8.5010
**          8.3943
**  6.5017
** 
Savings (REFI)          (7.81)    (5.95)            (7.49)    (5.61) 
 
Mortgage Equity           0.1274  0.2524
**           0.1395 
  0.2717
** 
Withdrawal (MEW)          (1.10)    (2.59)             (1.31)    (2.84) 
 
 
 t-statistics in parentheses. *(**) denotes significant at the 5% (1%) level. 
 